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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

- vs. -

Case No.
12527

JERRY LEE ANDERSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
'rhe appellant, Jerry Lee Anderson, appeals from
a conviction of murder in the first degree in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Jerry Lee Anderson, was found
g-11ilty by a jury of murder in the first degree with a
r'°f·mnmendation of leniency on January 7, 1971, and
1;as thereafter sentenced to be committed to the Utah
Sta.fr Prison on January 15, 1971, for the term of life
1
"
ltard labor.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction of mur
der in the first degree and a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant and Charles Gustafson had been out
together the night of August 15, 1970, and the early
morning of August 16, 1970, drinking and frequenting
different taverns and private clubs. (R. 277-283) Appellant was taken home by Mr. Gustaf son at around 6:30
a.m. on August 16, 1970. Appellant testified that he
got out of the car to go in his house, he heard Mr.
Gustafs-0n say something like "I've got to you now" or
"I won't miss now" (R. 314), and he turned around and
saw Mr. Gustafson pointing a gun at him. (R. 2881
Appellant pulled out his gun as he turned and startt-d
firing and quit only when Mr. Gustafson fell to the
ground. (R. 289) Appellant testified that he was afraid
he would get shot and he was scared. (R. 289) Appellant
had been robbed and beaten on July 31, 1970, and so
had armed himself on Aupust 10, 1970. (R. 286,
304) Appellant was treated at the University Hosp1t:Bl
for scalp wounds and facial lacerations on Jnly 31, 19/0.
(R. 354) After the shooting appellant went in the house.
He returned with a blanket and covered Mr. Gustafson.
(R. 291)

Two neighbors testified that they were awakl'ne,J
by shots and looked out the window and saw aprwllan'.
trying to put the victim in the trunk of a car. (R. llli
They called the police, who arrived shortly. Offrer'
Cardwell and Mitchell testified that they arrived aroun 1
1

•)
.j

i :}:1 ,i.111. and saw a body on the gTournl, seemingly

or jerking. (R. 133, 148) As Officer Canhn·ll
ro1111d('d the ('Orner of a garage he rould sef' ap1wllant
11tlling on the victim's arm causing the body to move .
1

11 11iYing

.\ppellant testifi<>d that he was trying to pnll thP hod)'
:11to 11w garagt>. (H. 294) Prior to this, amwllant said
!11• lind tried to put the victim into tlw tnmk of the
,idim\.; car. He said he
through the victim's

pockets looking for the keys to tnrn the car around
,.;o lw could load the victim into thP trunk ( K
TlH' ,,ictim's porkets \YPre tnrm•d im.;ide out when

tlw polic<' arrived. (R. 214) Appellant testified that
IH' tried to lift l1im and rip1wd his pockets. (R '.294)
l'pnn tf')'ing then to pull the victim into the garage he
:<aw a rnov<>rnPnt and thought it was rnore pPople who
\\(']"(' tr)'ing to gd him, so he pointPd his gnn at what
rnrned ont to he Officer CardwPll as he ronnded the
t·onwr of the garage. (R. 294, 295, 133) Offic<'r MitclH;ll
!tad his gun on appellant and after telling ap1wllant to
1lrnp thP gun a couple of times, appellant was hand1·1Jffpd and arrested. (R. 150) Appellant frstified that
Ii" dill not imrnediatel)' S<'P that it was policP officers,
i1ut lw thought it was more 1wople after him. (H. 294)
, \ t the scent>, a gun other than appellant's wa:-<

in the front seat of thP \'ictim 's ear and tlw
. . ' s wall<'t was on t l1e b ac k seat. ( }'>\. 1:J.:>,
- ') ')1-)
111·ttm
:J rJi]. 1e
:,11111d

,J

1i11 illl's \\'all Pt had no mmwy in it and thP snaps to
·

eornp<ll'trn<•nts all w0r0 01wn<'d. (R. 2Hi) Appel-

4
lant testifi0d that he picked the victim's gun and wa!JH
up off the ground from where he had fallen and tJ 11 ,.\
them in the car, along with his (apvellant's) sl1irt rn.
295) Appellant testified that he did not 01wn tlw Yivtirn'wallet. ( R. 295)
Appellant testified that he did not call the iw1 1u
because he did not get along with them, as he had h('i·:
convicted of several felonies, and he did not think tlv
police would believe him. ( R. 299)
Officer Luker arrived at the scene shortly aft,;
appellant was arrested. He searched appellant a111:
found $111.00 in cash and a check and car k<•ys t!i;,
were to the victim's car. (R. 241, 244) At the scPw,
appellant \Vas asked why he shot the victim and appt'llau
answered that it was lwcans0 thP victim had p11llrd a g11n
on him. (R. 254) At the jail later, appellant again fold
the officers that the victim pulled a gun and he (np]H·1lant) believed the vicbm was one of tlw men who
after him. (R. 255)

\1;1,

Still later at the jail, ap1wl\;rn:

again said he thought the victim was going to shoot l1i1

11

and that is why he shot him. (R. 255) Offic('r Lnkt'
testified also that appellant said he pointed tlw g·Ln : ·
Officer Card"'ell because he had killed one man alrvwi
and another \Vonld not make any difference, (R
and he thought he could kill one cop and get
with it. (R. 256)

11\\;

Tl1'' eanse of death was internal and t.•xte>rnal blood
( H.
'l1lwre were five gun shot wounds in the
-,l('tirn. (R lGG)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE

COURT

BELOW

ERRED

IN

REQUIRING

APPELLANT TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ABOUT
A CHECK FOUND IN HIS WALLET BECAUSE IT
VIOLATED

HIS

PRIVILEGE

AGAINST

SELF-

INCRIMINATION AND IT WAS EVIDENCE OF
ANOTHER CRIME UNRELATED TO THE CHARGE
AT TRIAL.

On cross Pxamination, appellant was asked about
th<-'
he had in his wallet. (R. 349, 3!JO) Appellant
\1·a;.,; :-:!10wn a check made payable to him from Gary
1;1'('<-'nhnrg 8ervice, dat<'d Angnst 7, H>70, signtid
Ortienburg. (Exhibit 35, R. 350) Appellant was
hy counsel not to answer qlwstions ahont tlw
('ht·f'k heeause of other matters. (R. 350) Appellant
''a:-; for(•pd to answtir, over objection, whetlwr lw had
<·htick in his wallet at tlt0 font> of arrtist. (R. 350,
:;.-1]) ( 'ounsPl olJjectPd on tlw basis that answers would
i1HTi111inat<• ap1wllant, bnt he was forced to answer that
:... l1ad 1rnt worlu·d for Gary Greenlrnrg. Later, Gary
'' 11

"11liurµ; t<•stified that appellant ha(l

llPn'l'

worked for

6

him, that he (Greenburg) never made a check ont ti.
appellant, and that blank checks had been stolen fr 0111
his business prior to Angust 16, 1970. (R. :362, :3li:J 1
Appellant contends that by being required to an 8, 111
questions concerning this check, appellant's
against self-incrimination was violated under the lnited
States' Constitution, Amendment I and the Utah Coll
stitution, Art. 1, Sec. 12.

In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12
L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964) the United StatPs Supreme Conrt
held that the federal standard concerning thP pri\·ilege
against self-incrimination was applicable to the stat<''·
That standard was said to be, quoting from H off111r111 1.
United States, 3-H U.S. 479, 71 N. Ct. 81-±, 95 L. :B:cl. 111''
(1950) :
"The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves SU}Jport a e1i11
viction . . . but likewise embraces thos(• whil'i1
would furnish a link in the chain of evidPJh"
needed to prosecute . . . [I] f the witness, upo:1
interposing his claim, were rPquired to prow th
hazard ... he would be compelled to ::·rnrrend1•1
1
the very protection which the priYil<>gP
k
signed to guarantee. To susta\n the privilegt" 11
need only be evident from the implication of tJi,·
in the sPtting in which it is asked, tlin
a responsive answPr to the questions or an ('\l' 11
nation of why it cannot be answPred might
dangeroms
injurious disclosure could '".
sult. \.Ve also said that, in applying that ti': ·
1
•

:
1
1

'

I

the judge must be pn-fectly clear from a careful
eonsideration of all the circmnstances in thP case
that the witness is mistaken, and that sueh
answers cannot possilJ!y have snch a tendency
to ineriminate." 378 lT.S. at 11, ] 2.
'l1hat privilege described in Malloy is the privilege
of a witness. The privilege to be afforded an accused
is dearly at least as great; indeed it is greater, as a
dPfendant need not take the stand at all and no comment can be made on his failure to do so. Griffin 't:.
California, 380 U.S., 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed. 2d
lOS ( 19()5). When a defendant does take the stand, he
waiV('S his privilege as to relevant facts connected to
the offense. As this court has held, when a defendant
takes the stand he is in the same status as a witness; he
is to be treated as a witness for purposes of the privilege
againt self-incrimination, State v. Brown, 1G Utah 2d
395 P. 2d 727, 729 (19{i4). 'J1he standard to he
accordt>d to a witness is set forth in J.lJ alloy

1:.

JI ogau,

Supra, and in the statutes of Utah. 78-24-9, Utah Code
Ann., ( 1953), states:

"A witness must answer questions legal and
pertinent to the matter in issne, although his
ans\\·ers may establish a claim against himself;
bnt he need not give an answer whi<'h will have
a tendencv to subjeet him to punishment for a
f Plony."

8

This court has set forth what "tends to incrimillak"
in State v. Byington, 114 Utah 388, 200 P. 2d 723 (l!J.J:\1
There the defendant was convicted of perjury. ThP c·oi.
viction arose out of the following facts. The dt>fornlu 111
in an order to show cause hearing was hPld to
('I
why he should not be held in contempt for failnn" 111
pay child's support or alimony. At that hearing ]1"
testified he had remarried, but could not docrnrwnt till'
fact. He later, out of court, admitted that he was n(li
remarried but that he was living with another woma11
and had a child by her. He was charged with perjun
and the transcript of the order to show cause
was introduced at trial. This court held that this Yio
lated the defendant's privilege against self-incrirninati11n
under the federal and state constitutions. ''It ii'.> fmtlJ1'1
generally recognized that an:- fact which is a
or essential part of a crime' if testified to hy a
would tend to incriminate him." 200 P.2d at 724. Thio
court went on to say that when tlw defendant wa!'

qn("'

tioned at the first hearing he either had to clHHbl'
refuse to answer, or admit one of the de>nwnts

or

i 11

tl 11

crime of fornication, or give false testimony. "Tl::
persons shall not be plact-d in such position ic' one

1
'

1
"

the purposes of those constitutional provision:-.''
P. 2d at 725. The conviction was set aside with din·ctioi:,
to dismiss tl1e action. See also State

L

lhdcl1i11so11.

Ii"

Ftah 409, 200 P. 2d 733 (19G8), the companion

Byington. There this court similarly disposed

ol

11

(·onYirtion of Byington's common law wife on the grounds
that lH)l' answers were obtainPd in violation of her right
('l o·ainst :,.;c;lf-incrimination.
Appellant at the time of trial was still subject to
1nmwcution for forgery of that particular check, as that
dieck had not been introducd at the forgery trial. ( R. 337,
,JI

c.

By forcing appellant to answer questions abont the
rheck (Exhibit 35), the court below violated appellant's
privilege agaim1t self - incrimination. Appellant was
forcPd to answer that he did not work for the maker
of the check. He wm; forced to answer over objection
if hP had the check in his possPssion. ConplPd with the
soon-to-follow testimony of Gary Greenburg that he had
had check blanks stolen shortly before appellant's arr<:>st,
this evidence clearly forced appellant to giv<> an answt>r
that kndPd to subject him to punishment for a felony.
Tt rlearly made appellant give answPrs that wer<> at
]past a link in incriminating him in tlw eri11w of forgery.
'!'hat kstimony was a "necPssary or ess<•ntial part of
tlir <'ri11H'" of forgery. StatP i:. Byington, supra.
By requiring appellant to answer these qtwstions,
the court below put appellant in the difficult position of
to admit his participation in the forgtin·, with
all tit\' attendant bad influence that would have on the
.Jilt_\·, or having to tr_\· to explain away tlH• <'hPrks, with
il11· IPstdtant damage to appPllant's credibility and the

10
bad influence that would have on the jnry. Av1wllant
chose the latter approach (R. 351) and tried to PXIJ!a 111
away the check. rrhis clearly hurt his eredibility 111
the minds of the jnrors, and in a case sud1 as tJt;,
where self-defense was claimed, credibility could hP tL"
all important factor in the jury's decision. Thns, Ji,
putting appellant in this position, the court below

to11i-

mitted prejudicial error. Appellant should not ha\·e bPt·11
required either to admit his role in another crime

lll

to try to explain it away. \Vhile it is no doubt tn11·
that the State should have the opporhmity to fully elrnllenge appellant's credibility, the State should not lrnn
this opportunity at the expense of appellant's
ag·ainst st'lf-incrimination. rrhis court cannot say that
the court below fonnd it ''perfoctly clear" from all tk
circumstances in the case that appellant's answPr could
not "possibly have a tendency to incriminate as rcqnin·il
by JJfalloy v. Hogn11, sHpra. The court below in·<>.irnlieiall:
erred in putting appellant in this position, and tlwrel'o;•
appellant is entitled to a new trial without having

t11

answer for other crimes.
Not only was appellant's privilege against
incrimination violated by this testimony smToumling iii·
. ti .
check (Exhibit 35), but the evidence snrronn<l rng ·1•
check was also evidence of other crimes totally nnrebti '
to the charge at trial.

1

11

'I'll<• rnle conc(·rning the adrnis:;;ability of evidence
Pi' ot Jwr l'l'irnes is stated most elearly in State 1.·. Lupez,
r1ah 2<l 2;>7, 4;)1 P. :2d 772, 77;) ( 19<i9):
.. E.,·icl<·neP of other cri11ws is 110t ad111issahl(' i l'
purpose is to disgraeP th<' ddt•1Hlant as a
1wn;on of evil eharadl:'r \\·ith a propensit:·: to
(•0111mit crimp and thus
to han• eomrnittl•tl
the crirnP C'harge<l. However, if tlw <•vi<l<'nce has
rell-'vane,v to explain th<> circmnstancPs snrrnmHling the instant erinw, it is admissahlP for that
1n1rpm.;l', and the faet that it may tend to ('Olln<'{·t
tlw drfrndant with anotlwr eri11H• \\'ill uot n•1HlPr
it incornpdent. Sueh harm as tht>n• 111a,v lw in
n•ePi vi ng ev iden el:' eonc·ern ing ano t lwr nilll(' is
to lH' wPighl-'d agai11st thP
of full inquin·
into tlw faC'ts rPlating to tlw iss1ws."

abo, for the same rul<', Stale r. Jolwso11, 25 Utah
lGO, -!,/,'\ P. 2d 491 (1970); State L'. Olllia11,
Utah
:372.
P. 2d 811 (1970); State 1·. Scott, 111 Ptah 9,

:-;pp

11,·) p. :2<l 1() 1() ( 1943) .

App<'llant cont(•nds that the> <'ntirP episode snr111trndi11g- tl1is ehe('k shonld not

lwen adrnittd. Appel-

lmit ohjPetPd that it wt>nt into othPr

(H. 350)

Tlie t(•st imon:· surrounding tlw check, follm\·Pd

that

11f (;arY Oreenhnrg, was evidenee of another crime:
:111(.',1·1·).

It

did not <>xplain tlH· ('irenmstances

'!ll'f'l)1111ding· a ehargP of first dt-gn•f• 1t11ud<·r. The onl.'·
11

\!''i'·'"'' of tlw ('\'idPJI<'<' s11rro111Hlin.g- this elwek

to

12
make appellant look like a man of evil character, with
a propensity to commit crime, and thus likely to ha1 ,.
committed the crime charged. There was simply rn·
reason for such evidence. It did not even approac: 1
the facts relating to the issues. Whatever the issues ari·
in a murder case when self-defense is claimed, it is f•lf'ar
that one of them is not whether the accused had in !iii
possession a forged check made out to himself. 1'111·
State was clearly doing more than just challenging av1wl
lant's credibility, as that could have been done withont
the testimony of Gary Greenburg. Gary Greenburg
called to testify that he did not know appellant, tliat
he never made a check out to him, and that he had
some checks stolen previously. This was not a challengl'
of appellant's credibility, it was clearly an att<:>mIJ! tu
show that appellant was involved in a prior forge!')
escapade. Under State v. Lopez, supra, and the rase'
cited, it cannot be said, weighing the harm in receiYing
such evidence against the necessity of full inquiry intu
the facts relating to the issues, that this evidencP relat 11 i
to the facts in issue; they simply made appellant look
like a man with a propensity for crime. Where tli·
d(>fense of self-defense was claimed, appellant's char
acter and credibility were all important. Any <:>vitlPnei
e-rroneously admitted that destroyed this character would
certainly be prejudicial error; this court has said tha:
evidence of other crimes is "apt to be giyen undw
weight." State v. Wellard, 3 Utah 2d 1239, 279 P.
914, 917 (1955).

Therefore, because the court lwlu

1

.,
.)

committed prejudicial error in allowing the te:::;timony
, 11 1rou11cling the check, appellant i8 entitled to a new
trial without such erroneous evidence.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A VERDICT OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER
UNDER EITHER OF THE TWO THEORIES OF
THE STATE.

The State proceeded on two theorit>s - that this
was a killing in the perpetration of a robbery and that
it m1s a <h,liherate and premeditatPd killing. (R. 95)
.As to the felony-murder thPory that tl1is ·was a
killinp; in the peqwtratiou of a robbery, the <'\·idence
iaken in the light most fa\·orahle to the wrdiet reveals
ahnost nothing to support a rohbPry. 'l'hP only <'vidt'nce
at all ·wa8 that the Yictirn'8 pockets \\'PH' turned inside
nut, his wallet had no mmwy and the snaps to the money
rompartrnents wC're open and that the vietirn had gottt'n
$:iS5.00 in cash from a bank on Angust 13, l 970. (H. 22G)
.lqipl'llant had $111.00 in cash on him when he was
aneslc'd,
in his wallet and the l'l"'st in his front
panh ]>oekel:. (R. 241) All of tlwst-• WPrl' <>xplained
1

itltPr b>· appellant or by other testimon>·· Appellant

bi ifiPd that he turned .Mr. U ustafson's
lll

' 1

inside

!:inking for the k<')'S to tnrn the ear around. (R. 293)
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The wallet was picked up by appellant and thrown into
the car. Carl Hicks testified that on August 14, 1970,
he was with the victim and the latter had spent abom
$160.00 on a party that night. (R. 267, 268) Clearh,
the fact that one has $385.00 on one day and thn·p
days later has nothing in his wallet is not very stron'"
evidence that one has been robbed. While it is trne that
the jury might not have believed appellant's explanDtions, the evidence is still clearly deficient in view 11f
the purposes it was to serve. That is, if the robben ,
is the basis for the first degree murder conviction
the felony murder rule ,the robbery must be clearly
shown. The theory of the felony murder rule is that ,
the intent to commit the felony (here, robbery) is
ferred from that offense to the homicide actually corn
mitted. State v. Thorne, 39 Utah 208, 117 P. 58 (1911).
In People v. Sears, 44 Cal-Rpts. 330, 401 P. 2d 9:JS '
( 1965), the court set forth the rule and the ra tionalP,
401 P. 2d at 943:
"The legislature has decreed that any
who undertakes to commit any of the ennnwrate 1l
felonies will be guilty of first degree rnurd11r if
such undertaking results in the loss of a human
life. This doctrine emanates from the
risk of hann inherent in the felonious con<lnc'
involved. Yet, in order to establish a defendant',
guilt of first degree murder on the theory thnr
he committed the killing during the peqwrtatwn

1;)

uf one of the enumerated feloni(•s, tltt' prost>cntion
rnnst }H'OVP that lw harhon"cl tlH_• t-'}W<'ifie intent
to commit one of :-rnch Pnmneratl·d fr!oni<'s . . . .
l'nder the frlon>' murdPr doetrirn•, tlH' intent n•quired for a ronviction of mnnlPr is imported
from the s1weific intent to eommi t tlw eorn·mnitant
fr)ony .... rl'o presUllH' an int<'nt to rnailll from
tlw ad or tn)e of injur>' inflid<•d, and tlwn trnnsfrr such 'presumPd intPnt' to support a f Plony
rnnrd<>r ronviction is artifieiall>· to extPrnl the
fiction .... rl1lw doetrine of felony llltl]'(}( l', tJHTPfore, must lw limit<•d to thm;p <·asPs in whieh
an inhmt to commit thP frlon>· ean he :-:hO\rn frolll
thP PVidPnCP."
1

was a prosecution for ±'Pion>· 11rnnlPr, tlH' i'Plony
l1ting rnayJH·m. 'l'lw smnP rational<' applie:-: wherP fop
is rohlwry. \V}wre the evidene of a
i:-:
'n :-light, to prPsnnw tlwrP has ]wen a rohlwr>· lwC'anse
tlw Yidirn lias nn Pm pt>· 1YallPt and hi:-1 pockets 1ue t unwd
insi<lP 011 t, and then transfrr this •·pn':-:1111w<l intPnt"
to :-m.:tain a conviction for first dl•g-n•(' 11mrdN i:-:, as

:-:aid, artificiall>· "<•xtendinp; Uu" fidion.'' Such a

;..;, 111s

rnling would lllPan that onP <'<mid lw C'om·iet(·d of first
1]Pgn-•(•

rnm·dl'r based npon a double prt>sm11ption 1i·hieh

llllld;:; that it is }H'Psnrn<'d one had the> intPnt to kill
h1·<·a11;-;p

hP had tlw inknt to rob, and it is pre::-;11mPd

lit' had the intent to rob b<:•cansP thl' de('l'ased did not
!':1\'t'

an>· money, his porkt>ts wPre insid<' out, and th<'

:1,·(·ll:-Pd

did han' mon<>y. That is ch-'arly PXtPnding the

·t11111

too far, ns Scnrs and otlwr easE':-: have lwld.

•· 1
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See also, People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. Rptr. "'163 '
P. 2d 43 (1965) for the same reasoning.

1

1IJ1j

From the verdict it is not possible to tell if th("
jury based its decision on the felony murder rule u1·
not. If they did, it is clear that the evidence does not
support the verdict. As this court cannot say which
theory the verdict was based on, appellant is entitled tt·
a new trial because the evidence was not sufficient tv
support the verdict under the felony murder theory.
Further, the evidence was not sufficient to suppori
the verdict under the State's other theory, that the killing
was deliberate and premditated. The only evidence thnt
could support that theory was appellant's admission on
cross examination that on the morning of the killing,
in a lounge, he told a friend that he was going to kill
a couple of guys if he could find them. (R. 308)
lant denied that the victim was one of those men he ,,·ai
referring to. (R. 308)
There was some physical evidence which was sO!lll·
what contradictory of appellant's version of how
killing occurred. There was some slight discrepanr:
between what appllant said he told the
aHJ
what the officers said he told them. For exarnpk
Officer Luker testified that appellant once tol<l ]tiu.
11

that he (appellant) got out of the car because the victu
. I
(R ro·.
1
pulled a gun on him while they wPre m t 1e car. ·

17
Jfo1rPnr, Officer Luker stated that each time appellant
with him about the shooting he stated he shot
tlr<' yjdim because he had pulled a gun on him and appellant 11·as afraid he would get shot. (R. 256) 'J'aking this
'"·id('m'1' in the light most favorable to the verdict it
did not demonstrate deliberation and premeditation,

11 hich wen-' ddined in the instructions to the jury (Indruction 17, H. 40) as meaning planned, thought out,
01

clesigned beforehand; a weighing of the motives in a

,,elf-controlled state. It is a possibility that that was
wliat happened, hut tlwre was not sufficirnt evidence

to s11pport such a finding and verdict.

'l 1he verdict was

"ontrary to the evidence and thus, appellant is entitled
und(·l' 77-38-3(G), Utah Code Ann., (1953), to a new trial.

POINT III
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING TO
GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
CONCERNING THE RIGHTS OF ONE TO ARM
Hll\1SELF IN ADVANCE IF HE ANTICIPATES
THE NEED FOR SELF-DEFENSE .

.\p1wl1ant requested that the jury he gIYen an m'tl'llction as follows: (R. 65) "Yon are iustrnctt•d that
a JH'l'son may anticipate his need for a mea1rn of self
rl 1·f1·nse and arm himself in advaner." App(•llant excepted
111 11t .. ("011rt's failurP to so instrnet the jnr.'·· (R.

Appellant contends that, in light of the factfi and
circumsances of this case, and in light of the instrnetion
given on self-defense (Instruction No. 19, R. 42) it waerror to refuse the giving of such requested instruction
In People v. Moore, 43 Cal. 2d 517, 275 P. 2d -±s;1
( 1954), the California Supreme Court reversed a manslaughter conviction and held, 275 P. 2d at 493, that
"The jury should have been instructed on
sible influence of antecedent thn)ats so far a,
the conduct of the defendant in arming ltrrnelt
with the deadly weapon on the nig·ht in
was concerned.''
In that ease, the defendant and her husband had scwr1
marital difficulties. He had beaten her often. He calleu
and said he was coming over, she got a gun from lwr
house, and when he arrived, there was a struggle anLl
he was shot. The husband had threatened the defendallt
often, and she was afraid of him and that is whY sh,,
got the gun. The court held that vdwre the evident''
of who was the aggressor was close, and the court PrreJ
in giving and failing to give other instructions, tltf'r.
may have been a miscarriage of justice and so pre,i 11
dicial error was found and a reversal ''rns req11ired.
In State v. Burkett, 234 P. G81 (N.M. 1925), the er,ui:
said that if the defendant is given the perfect right

1
''

self-defense, an instruction that he has the right

1
'

arm himself in advance is not reqnin'd.

}l mrt'\·er.

if t:

!
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nc:lit of self-defense is abridged or limited by submitting
the issu<' of who was responsible for provoking the diffienlty such an instruction should be given. Brown v .
.
80 Wyo. 12, 336 P. 2d 794 (1959) quotes the
JJ1irkett rule, citing 41 C.J.S. Homicide §378(c)(4), and
lwld that if the court restricts the issue of self-defense
IJy submitting the issue of who was the provocateur, it
1nust submit an instruction on arming oneself in advance.
In Instruction No.19 (R. 42), the jury was instructed
that if the killer was the original assailant, he must
ha\ e declined any further struggle before the homicide.
This put to the jury the issue of who provoked the
rlifficnlty and thus comes within the above rule, and
so an instructon that appellant could arm himself in
advance if he anticipated the need for self-defense was
required.
Jt was prejudicial error under the facts and circumstances of this case not to so instruct. Appellant had
not been threatened by the victim. However, appellant
11.·as apprehensive that someone was trying to get him. He
l:ad been wounded on July 31, 1970, when someone hit
him over the head and robbed him. (R. 286) Appellant
had had trouble before this injury and he believed this injury and robber>' might have arisen from that trouble.
1

R. 2S8) rrhis injury was confirmed by Dr. Albert Finney

testified he treated appellant for a scalp wound and
fa(·ial laf'.erations on the night of July 31, 1970. (R. 354)

"1!10
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Appellant got the gun that he killed the victim \\itli
on August 10, 1970, and carried it since that
(R. 303, 304) because he expected trouble since he
beaten up. (R. 304) This was appellant's explanatir,n
as to why he was carrying the gun. Appellant admittP1i
on cross examination that on the night of the killiut
he said to a friend at a lounge that he was going to
kill a couple of guys, if he could find them. (R.
However, he said the victim was not one of them. (R.
From this, the jury could have possibly concluded that
appellant had a deliberate, premeditated design to lciU
and that is why he had the gun. If the requested im;truction had been given, it would have been made clear

tc•

the jury that appellant could have justifiably had
gun for a different reason, and that he was entitled

to

carry the gun for that reason.
For these reasons, it was error not to give
lant's requested instruction concerning the right to arm
oneself in advance if the need for self-defense is antii·'.
pated.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, that the court belo\\
erred in requiring appellant to answer certain que-slio:,·
that the verdict was contrary to the evidence, and tlia

:..'.1

eourt below erred in failing to giYe appella11t\ re<[lW"kJ jmy instruction, appellant
submits
diat the conYiction be reversd and a nPw trial bP granted.

i)il'

Respectfully suhmittf•d,

DAVID P. RHODE
Attorney for Appellant

